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Abstract
We analyze the distribution of broadcasting revenues by sports leagues.
In the context of an isolated league, we show that when the teams engage
in competitive bidding to attract talent, the league's optimal choice is full
revenue sharing (resulting in full competitive balance) even if the revenues are
independent of the level of balancedness. This result is overturned when the
league has no monopsony power in the talent market. When the teams of
two di®erent leagues bid for talent, the equilibrium level of revenue sharing is
bounded away from the full sharing of revenues: leagues choose a performance-
based reward scheme. Finally, we argue that our model explains the observed
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1di®erences in revenue sharing rules used by the U.S. sports leagues (full revenue
sharing) and European soccer leagues (performance-based reward).
21 Introduction
The organization of professional sports in the United States di®ers from the one in
Europe in that for each sport, there is one main league (NBA for basketball, MLB for
baseball, NFL for football and NHL for hockey). Consequently, since the movement of
talent across the Atlantic is negligible, leagues in the United States enjoy a monopsony
position in the market for talent. Thus, when American teams compete to attract
the best players, only the distribution of talent is a®ected, while the total amount of
talent in the league stays constant.
Conversely, Europe is characterized by one main sport (soccer) and in each country
there is a top domestic league (Premiership in England, Premiµ ere Division in France,
Serie A in Italy, Liga in Spain, ...). As a result, European leagues can increase their
total amount of talent (and hence, their attractiveness to broadcasters) by poaching
star players from a foreign league. For example, one can reasonably assert that when
the Brazilian superstar Ronaldo was traded from Barcelona (Spain) to Internazionale
(a team from Milan, Italy), the attractiveness of the Spanish league decreased, while
that of the Italian League increased.1 Therefore, in Europe, not only the teams, but
the leagues as well have incentives to compete for talent.
Another di®erence between the United States and Europe is the revenue sharing
rules used by the leagues. In the United States, revenues from national TV deals are
shared in an egalitarian way. As Scully (1995) explains, \National rights are evenly
split among the clubs in the leagues without regards to the performance of particular
clubs. It is assumed that these shared revenues are determined by league-wide talent
levels." In contrast, in Europe, the amount a team receives is closely related to its
results obtained in the competition2 (see Tables 1 and 2).
The goal of this paper is to show that the use of performance-based reward schemes
by European soccer leagues can be explained by the competitive environment in
1Futher evidence of the enhanced attractiveness of leagues with the highest concentration of star
players (Italy and Spain) is that every weekend a game from the Italian Serie A is broadcasted in
England (ITV) and in the Netherlands (Canal+) and top games from the Spanish Liga and Serie A
are broadcasted in France (Canal+).
2There is also less revenue sharing of gate income in European soccer leagues than in most the
of US sports leagues. For example, in England and Italy, there is no sharing of gate income while
in Germany only 6% of gate income is paid to the league. In the NFL, 40% of net gate income goes
to the visiting team. In baseball, 10% and 20% of gate income goest to the visiting team in the
National League and in the American League, respectively.
3which they operate. Conversely, the traditional argument of a demand for a balanced
distribution of talent does not in itself explain the equal division rule used in the
United States.
The intuition for our result is the following. If inter-league movements of players
are not restricted and league-wide talent levels in°uence the revenue leagues get from
national TV deals, then leagues compete for superstar players. However, they cannot
do it in a direct way, since players are hired by teams. Hence, a league wishing to
attract top players must provide the incentives for domestic teams to bid a higher
price than foreign teams. Now, the value of a player who increases the probability
of winning increases with the amount awarded to the winner. Hence, a performance-
based reward increases the price domestic teams are willing to bid for top players.
By the above argument, one could rush to the conclusion that competing leagues
should choose a winner-takes-all reward scheme. There are two main reasons why
this is not so. First, the teams that e®ectively buy the top players face the risk
of bankruptcy if they do not end up winning the competition. Since this risk is
increasing in the winner's share, there is a trade-o®. Second, leagues care also about
the competitive balance of the championship they organize. Hence, if the di®erence of
wealth between teams from the same league became too large, the top players would
be concentrated in a very small number of teams, decreasing the uncertainty of many
games, which would in°uence negatively the revenue the league raised from TV deals.
A special feature of our model is the bidding mechanism we posit for the com-
petitive allocation of talent, which is closely related to recent work on auctions with
externalities (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996, and Jehiel et al., 1996). These auc-
tions are characterized by interdependent valuations, where a bidder does not only
care about winning, but also about who gets the object in case she does not win. In
our model, if the winner of the auction is from the same league, then losing is not
as harmful, since even though the team gets a smaller share, the total revenue of the
league will remain high. However, if the winner is from the other league, the loss with
respect to winning the auction is much higher, since the aggregate talent level of the
league decreases.
Several papers have studied the in°uence of revenue sharing on the demand for
sport (El Hodiri and Quirk, 1971, Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart, 1988, Fort and
Quirk, 1995, Vrooman, 1995). However, they focus on the optimality of cross subsidies
4as used in the monopsonistic3 economy of the United States and do not study the
implications of performance-based revenue sharing rules.
The papers most related to ours are those of Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) and
Palomino and Rigotti (2000). As our model, Hoehn and Szymanski compare a league
operating in a competitive environment and an isolated one. They study the impact
of the participation of top clubs in international competitions on the competitive
balance of the domestic leagues. They do not address the issue of the optimal level
of revenue sharing. Palomino and Rigotti consider a multi-period situation in which
the demand for sport depends on the aggregate talent level, competitive balance and
the e®ort produced by teams. They show that demand maximization does not lead
to full revenue sharing, since even though revenue sharing fosters competitive balance
among teams, it also lowers their incentives to win (and hence their equilibrium level
of e®ort).
While our main goal is to provide for an economic rationale for the observed
di®erences between the U.S. and European sports leagues, the underlying intuition is
exportable to other spheres of economic activity. Consider, for example, oligopolistic
¯rms of di®erent countries competing for (scarce) foreign direct investment. In this
set-up, our results imply that, in equilibrium, the governments of these countries
would put relatively lenient competition policy barriers in place, in order to enhance
their ¯rms' competitive position.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 considers the case of isolated leagues. Section 4 analyzes the competition
between leagues and Section 5 argues the robustness of our results. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2 The model
We present the simplest possible model that still enables us to address the issue of
optimal revenue sharing when there is (potential) competition for players between
3Fort and Quirk (1995) do address the issue of rival leagues in the US context. However, their
main conclusion is that the existence of competing leagues has been a transitory phenomenon, and
the pro¯t motives have always led either to a merger or to an exit. In Europe, at least to date,
because of the national nature of the leagues, steady state rivalry is feasible. Note however, that the
introduction of the Champions' League was a move in the same direction.
5leagues.4 There are 2 leagues, a and b. Each league is made up of two teams, tj;1 and
tj;2 (j = a;b). Each team is composed of one player and teams of the same league
compete in a championship.
There are ¯ve potential players: four players of (relatively) low talent (l players)
and one player of high talent (h player). The quality of the players in°uences the
probability that a team wins the competition. If both teams in a league are composed
of l players (l teams), their probability of winning the championship is 1=2 each. A
team with a h player (h team) opposed to a l team has a probability ¼ > 1=2 of
winning the championship.
Each league j (j = a;b) has an amount Kj of broadcasting revenue to split between
the winner and the loser of the championship it organizes. We denote ®j ¸ 1=2 the
share which is awarded to the winner. Thus, ®j represents the level of revenue sharing
chosen by league j. The two extreme cases are ®j = 1=2 and ®j = 1; which correspond
to the league choosing full revenue sharing { thus not rewarding the teams on the
basis of their performance { and to a contest, where the winner takes all, respectively.
The amount Kj league j has to split depends on the quality of the players involved
in the league. The idea is that leagues sell the rights to broadcast the competition to
TV networks and the price networks are willing to pay depends on the quality of the
competition, i.e., the quality of the players involved in the league. Let K(q1;q2) be
the price paid by a network if the two teams participating in the league are of quality
q1 and q2. We assume that K(h;l) = K > K(l;l) = 0. Two factors in°uence the
demand for sport, the skills of the players and the uncertainty of the outcome. The
inequality K(h;l) > K(l;l) means that the skill e®ect dominates the uncertainty one
and K(l;l) = 0 means that there is no demand for games played only by low talent
players.5
Following Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988), we assume that the objective
of each league is to choose a level of revenue sharing (®) so as to maximize the
aggregate pro¯t of its teams. That is, in addition to its revenue from TV deals (K),
a league also internalizes the cost that obtaining the h player in°icts on one of its
teams.6
4In the Discussion, we will argue that our ¯ndings are robust to generalizations of this model.
5Our model thus ¯ts Rosen's (1981) de¯nition of Superstars: a small percentage of an already
reduced ¯eld of agents who are responsible for most of the traded volume.
6In the Discussion, we will explain how our results change if this assumption is relaxed.
6The objective of the teams is to maximize their expected pro¯t. Teams compete
with each other on two levels. First, they compete in an auction to attract the
h player. Second they compete \on the ¯eld" with the other team from the same
league. We assume that team i (i = 1;2) from league j (j = a;b) has an initial
wealth Wj;i and that in the auction, a team cannot bid higher than its ¯nal wealth
(in¯nite cost of bankruptcy). This implies that the highest price team i from league
j can bid is
Bj;i = (1 ¡ ®j)K + Wj;i (1)
We consider the following sequence of events: Leagues a and b choose simulta-
neously their level of revenue sharing ®a and ®b, respectively. Teams observe ®a
and ®b and simultaneously make salary o®ers to the h player. Following Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1996), in order to obviate existence issues, we assume that there is a
smallest monetary unit ". The h player accepts the highest bid.7 If several teams
make the highest bid, the h player chooses a team randomly. The losing teams are
allocated one l player each at zero cost. Finally, the championship takes place.
3 The benchmark case: Two isolated leagues
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which players cannot move across leagues.
This corresponds to the case of US sports leagues, in the sense that the total talent
level of the league is constant. Of course, we are neglecting variations of total talent
due to the arrival of a young player or the retirement of an old one. Without loss of
generality, we assume that player h is allocated to league a. Hence, competition for
player h is only between teams ta;1 and ta;2, the revenues from TV deals for league a
is K and it is 0 for league b.
In such a situation, when deciding how much to bid for the acquisition of the h
player, a team knows that if it does not acquire the h player, then its opponent will.
Hence, for any ®a ¸ 1=2, the value of the h player for team ta;i (i = 1;2) is
V (®a) = (¼®a + (1 ¡ ®a)(1 ¡ ¼))K ¡ (¼(1 ¡ ®a) + ®a(1 ¡ ¼))K: (2)
The ¯rst term represents the gain of a h team when opposed to a l team while the
7Note that this mechanism is not optimal for the h player: he could extract more rent in a menu
auction (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1986), where the losing teams of the same league as the winner
would also pay for the positive externality created by the h player's presence in the league.
7second term represents the expected gain of a l team when opposed to a h team. Note
that V (®a) can be rewritten as
V (®a) = (2®a ¡ 1)(2¼ ¡ 1)K ¸ 0: (3)
When a league is isolated, its revenue is independent of the level of revenue sharing
it chooses. However, the level of revenue sharing does a®ect the price paid for the h
player. Therefore, the league chooses the value of ® that minimizes the transfer from
the teams to the players. Without loss of generality, assume that Wa;1 ¸ Wa;2: Then
in the auction, team ta;1 sets the price. It bids minfV (®a);Ba;2 + "g if Wa;1 > Wa;2,
while it bids minfV (®a);Ba;2g if Wa;1 = Wa;2: Given this, the optimal choice of the
league can be obtained easily:
Proposition 1 When the league's objective is to maximize the total ¯nal wealth of
teams, it sets ®¤ = 1=2.
Proof: Since the revenues are constant, the league wants to minimize the price
paid for the h player. Given the equilibrium bids derived above, the result follows
directly from the fact that V (®) is increasing in ®; and that V (1=2) = 0. ²
Hence, an isolated league representing the team owners has incentives to choose
full revenue sharing even in the absence of any competitive balance consideration.
In our simple model, this solution would leave the teams without an incentive to
win and, therefore, star players would earn the same salary as low quality players.
This extreme result is due to the fact that we have not taken into account additional
performance-related revenues for the teams like merchandising, or local TV deals,
which are not re-allocated by the league. In addition, it is widely recognized that
teams (both owners and players) have non-pecuniary incentives to win as well.
4 Competition between leagues
In this section, we open up the domestic player markets to international competition.
Thus, in principle, all four teams are bidding for the services of the h player. At the
same time, the leagues' choices of the levels of revenue sharing are transformed from
8two independent decision problems into a non-cooperative game, where we look for a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
By varying ®; the share of revenues awarded to the winner of the championship, a
league can a®ect two things: the identity of the team who obtains the services of the
h player, and the price paid for him. With respect to the ¯rst of these, a league only
cares about which league the h player ends up in, since league revenues are a function
of total talent. Moreover, by the individual rationality of each team, the equilibrium
price will always be such that the league, even if it internalizes this expenditure, will
always prefer to have the h player. Consequently, in order to ¯nd the pure strategy
Nash equilibria in the choice of ®i; we can focus on the (two-dimensional) binary
function, J : [1=2;1]
2 ! fa;bg; which shows for each possible pair (®a;®b) which
league obtains the services of the h player.8
Lemma 1 There are two possible types of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Either
one league attracts the h player with certainty or, since the highest bids from the two
leagues coincide, the h player can go to either league with positive probability. For a
given pair (®a;®b) to form a Nash equilibrium of the ¯rst type a necessary condition is
that given the ® of the winner (the league which attracts the h player) the J function
is constant in the ® of the loser. For an equilibrium of the second type the necessary
and su±cient condition is that J (®i;x) = i; (i = a;b) for all x 6= ®j (j 6= i).
Proof: For the non-random equilibrium note that, if the condition were not
satis¯ed, the loser league could deviate and attract the h player. The necessity part
of the other equilibrium follows by the same argument (and the fact that by the strict
monotonicity in ® of the willingness to pay, the undetermined regions of the J func-
tion (c.f. footnote 8) are of measure zero, even marginally). To see that in that case
the condition is also su±cient, just note that any deviation would strictly decrease
the deviator's pro¯t. ²
Under more restrictive assumptions, we can show that the necessary condition is
su±cient as well.
8Strictly speaking, the function is slightly more complicated, since at the frontier between two
areas where the h player goes to a di®erent league it is possible that the assignment is probabilistic.
9Corollary 1 The necessary condition for a non-random equilibrium in Lemma 1 is
also su±cient if either only one team from each league can bid for the h player or the
leagues maximize revenues.
Proof: If the leagues do not internalize the expenditures of their teams (that is,
they maximize revenue), then if the condition is satis¯ed, the winner league does not
want to, while the loser league cannot vary the outcome. If there is only one team
bidding per league, then the price paid for the h player is constant in the winner's
®; since it is determined by the willingness to pay of the team from the other league. ²
Using Lemma 1 and Corollary 1, we can give a useful description of the equilibrium
outcomes, based on the J function. As a ¯rst approximation, let us restrict attention
to the case where only the richer team of each league bids for the h player.9 As
the following lemma shows this is a meaningful exercise, since the equilibria of the
unrestricted game form a subset of the equilibria of the restricted one.
Lemma 2 In the game between the two leagues, any equilibrium revenue sharing
levels when all four teams bidding are also an equilibrium when only the richer teams
are bidding in each league.
Proof: Take any equilibrium in the unrestricted game. By Lemma 1 it must
satisfy a necessary condition, which for the restricted game is su±cient for equilib-
rium, by Corollary 1. ²
In order to characterize the J function, we need to solve for the equilibrium
continuation following an arbitrary choice of revenue sharing rules by the two leagues.
In the restricted game, the opportunity cost of losing the auction di®ers from that
of the previous section, since the rich team which does not obtain the h player will
compete in an (l;l) league. Consequently, we have that the value of the h player for
team ti;1 is
V
c(®i) = (¼®i + (1 ¡ ®i)(1 ¡ ¼))K: (4)
Given our assumption that bankruptcy is in¯nitely costly, the willingness to pay of
9We assume { without loss of generality { that team 1 is the richer one in each league: Wj;1 ¸ Wj;2
(j = a;b).
10team i;1 is then given by
minfV
c(®i);Bi;1g = minf(¼®i + (1 ¡ ®i)(1 ¡ ¼))K;(1 ¡ ®i)K + Wi;1g: (5)
Straightforward algebra reveals the following.
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Figure 1 shows the J function as derived from these six inequalities (c.f. the proof of
Proposition 2).
Insert Figure 1 here
Proposition 2 If only the richest team in each league bids for the h player then if





















Proof: Let Wi;1 > Wj;1: By solving for the crossing points of the lines in Fig-



























. Similarly, the sign of the slopes of all the lines are
as drawn. Thus, all we need to do is to deduce the value of the J function in the
di®erent areas. To the North-West of Z, the relevant values of the willingness to pay
are Bb;1 and V c(®a): Consequently, in this region the relevant inequality is (8) with
i = a and j = b: To the North-East of Z, the relevant values of the willingness to pay
are Ba;1 and Bb;1: Consequently, in this region the relevant inequality is (9): To the
South-East of Z, the relevant values of the willingness to pay are Ba;1 and V c(®b):
Consequently, in this region the relevant inequality is (8) with i = b and j = a: Fi-
nally, to the South-West of Z, the relevant values of the willingness to pay are V c(®a)
and V c(®b): Consequently, in this region the relevant inequality is (7): Therefore, the
J function is as drawn on Figure 1 and thus by Lemma 1 the Proposition's conditions
11are necessary, and by Corollary 1 su±cient. When Wi;1 = Wj;1; X, Y and Z coincide.
In this case, by Lemma 1 we have a unique type 2 equilibrium, at the crossing point. ²
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 2. In regions 1 to 4, the h player goes to league
b: In the other regions, he goes to league a: Hence, by Lemma 1, all equilibria are
such that ®a 2 (®a;®a): the equilibrium revenue sharing rule of the richer league is
of intermediate level. The elimination of low ®'s is a straightforward consequence
of the league's interest in providing strong enough incentives for its team to bid for
the h player. The elimination of the high ®'s is, in turn, driven by the bankruptcy
constraint (c.f. (1)): if incentives are high-powered, the losing team earns very little
and thus the bankruptcy constraint becomes binding at a low level.
Proposition 2 in conjunction with Lemma 2 states that the league attracting the h
player never chooses full revenue sharing in equilibrium. It should be remarked that
in Proposition 2, the price e®ects does not play any direct role in the determination
of the equilibrium levels of revenue sharing. As a consequence, the set of equilibria
remains rather large, especially so for the poorer league, whose equilibrium level of
revenue sharing is unconstrained. This is due to the restricted competition, that is,
only the rich teams are bidding for the h player. Taking account of the behavior of
the poor teams in both leagues can signi¯cantly re¯ne the set of equilibria. Most
notably, it can eliminate low ®'s as equilibrium behavior of the poorer league. To see
why, observe that the equilibrium price paid by the team who acquires the services
of the h player is determined by the second highest willingness to pay, which may
be of the other team of the same league. In such a case, by lowering ®; the league
can decrease the price without losing the h player (holding the poorer league's ®
constant). On the other hand, as a best response to this lower ®, the poorer league
may be able to attract the h player by setting a more performance driven revenue
sharing rule (higher ®). Hence, the objective of the richer league is to minimize ®
under the constraint that the poorer league does not obtain the h player. We now
develop this intuition in more detail.10
Without loss of generality, assume that Wa;1 > Wb;1. Furthermore, assume that
league b chooses ®b = 1=2. In that case V c (®b) < Bb;1 and thus the budget constraint
is not binding for the teams in the losing league. Now, consider the (non-empty) set
10The full characterization of equilibria for all parameter values is quite straightforward, but
lengthy and tedious, while it does not add much intuition.
12of ®a such that
V
c (1=2) < V (®a) < Ba;2 < Ba;1 < V
c (®a): (10)
In such a situation, the two teams from league a compete for the h player and
bid V (®a). It follows that league a chooses ®a so that the price paid for the h player
is minimized, subject to the constraint that the inequality V c (1=2) < V (®a) still
holds (and thus the league does not lose the h player). Since V (®a) is increasing is
®, the best reply of league a to ®b = 1=2 is ®0
a such that V (®0
a) = V c (1=2) + ".
Now, if there exists ®b such that V c (®b) < V c (®0
a) < Bb;1(®b), then league b can
attract the h player when league a sets ®0
a. Consequently, there is no equilibrium
such that ®b = 1=2. This situation is illustrated by Figure 2 where ®c
i is the solution
of V c (®) = Ba;1(®) (i = 1;2) and ®i is the solution of V (®) = Ba;1(®): For any
pair (®a;®b) in the grey region, inequalities (10) hold. The best reply of league a to
®b = 1=2 is ®0
a and any best reply of league b to ®0
a is ®b 2 (®0
b;®00
b).
Proceeding as above, one can show that for any parameter speci¯cation such that
®0
a < ®a, there exists ®b > 1=2 such that ®b ¸ ®b in equilibrium. Hence, both leagues
must choose a performance-based reward scheme in equilibrium.
Insert Figure 2 here
5 Discussion
In this section, we will argue that the conclusions based on the analysis of the seem-
ingly restrictive model of the previous sections are surprisingly(?) robust.
We have assumed that the objective function of the leagues is to maximize their
domestic aggregate net surplus. This may not be the case in general, since not all
teams incur the cost of hiring talent with equal probability. In this case, teams are
likely to bargain over the fraction of expenses the league should internalize in its
objective function. Consequently, it seems more realistic to assume that the league
will internalize only partially the expenses of the clubs. In other words, the true
objective function of a league is somewhere in between the maximization of joint
revenues and the maximization of aggregate net surplus. Note however, that under
this, more elaborate, hypothesis our results would remain unchanged. The reason is
that the teams' valuations, just as before, are increasing in ®: Hence, as long as the
13league internalizes somewhat the expenditure of the teams, it will want to minimize
it (whenever the price is determined by the valuation of a team from the league in
question).
Another seemingly strong assumption that we have made is that the cost of
bankruptcy is in¯nite. In fact, relaxing this assumption would strengthen our re-
sults even further. Note that imposing a ¯nite cost of bankruptcy instead, would be
equivalent11 to increasing the ex ante wealth of the teams. This would not a®ect the
result of the benchmark case. On the other hand, as it can be appreciated from (6)
and (8), the relevant curves in Figures 1 and 2 would move North-East, changing the
equilibrium set of ®'s away from (1=2;1=2): In the limit as the cost of bankruptcy
disappears (or, equivalently, the teams are in¯nitely wealthy), the only equilibrium
that remains is (1;1): the winner takes it all in both leagues.
Also, we have posited free agency. This assumption also favors revenue sharing. If
the teams pay each other for a transfer, the equilibrium in revenue sharing rules would
again be (1;1). To see this, observe that the team owning the rights to the h player
would be willing to transfer it for V c(®i): On the other hand the team purchasing
the h player would be willing to pay V c(®j): Since these teams do not internalize the
externalities of a transfer on the rest of the teams, both V c(®i) and V c(®j) are less
than the revenues generated for the league by the h player, K. Consequently, each
league wants to make sure that the h player ends up in one of its teams, driving the
®'s all the way up to one.
Finally, we have considered the case in which teams have only one source of income.
Multiple sources of income {each of them subject to revenue sharing allocation by the
leagues{ would not a®ect the results, the reason being that an increase in the sharing
of any source of revenue decreases the value of top players for teams.
11This equivalence only holds in ex ante terms. With small bankruptcy costs, teams would risk
bankruptcy and as a consequence they would sometimes go bankrupt (ex post). This possibility
could, in principle, induce the league to impose more revenue sharing (lower ®): Note, however, that
unless a bankrupt team causes negative externalities on the rest of the teams, this di®erence should
not a®ect the league's behavior (since the team has already internalized the risk). Now, in the case
of the top European soccer leagues there is always a Second Division, which can provide a team to
¯ll the bankrupt team's place, thus no externalities are present.
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17Ranking Fixed Amount Variable Amount Total
1 54.5 45.5 100
2 54.5 40.25 94.75
3 54.5 36.75 91.25
4 54.5 31.5 86
5 54.5 29.75 84.25
6 54.5 28 82.5
7 54.5 24.5 79
8 54.5 21 75.5
9 54.5 19.25 73.75
10 54.5 17.5 72
11 54.5 14 68.5
12 54.5 10.5 65
13 54.5 8.75 63.25
14 54.5 7 61.5
15 54.5 5.25 59.75
16 54.5 2 56.5
17 54.5 2 56.5
18 54.5 2 56.5






Table 2: Ratio of revenues for the season 1999-2000 is some top European soccer
leagues
18